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T 
axation  of  financial  institutions  promises 
to be a major topic of  discussion  this year 
and next as Congress considers a number of tax 
reforms and  proposals  to restructure  the 
nation's  financial  system.  Proposals to reduce 
or eliminate  various tax shelters  are likely  to 
receive  particular  attention  in  view  of  the 
continuing large deficits of the U.S.  Treasury. 
Financial  institutions  like  other  tax-paying 
groups can benefit from  legalized tax shelters. 
Some of  the tax. shelters  utilized  by  financial 
institutions include the exclusion from taxable 
income of  interest on state and local securities, 
deductions for  bad  debt or loan loss  reserves, 
and  tax credits  to  reduce  total  tax  liabilities 
such as the investment  and foreign tax credits. 
Tax reform also is likely to be of considerable 
interest  within  the financial  community  itself, 
particularly  for  those  depository  institutions 
that feel they bear a high tax burden relative to 
other  depository  institutions.  In  the  early 
1960's. for example, commercial banks argued 
for  tax  reform  since  their  income  taxes 
averaged 34 per cent of  net income while most 
thrift  institutions  paid  little  or  no  Federal 
income  taxes.'  Since  1962,  however, 
comniercial banks have reduced  their effective 
tax  rates  substantially.  In  contrast,  the  tax 
burden of  thrift institutions has risen sharply.  -  - 
Consequently,  thrift groups recently have been 
critical of the current tax laws. 
This  article  examines  the  upward  trend  in 
the Federal income tax burden of  savings  and 
loan  associations  and  mutual  savings  banks 
since 1962. The article also discusses the major 
Throughout  this article, the tax burden, or effective tax 
rate,  of  financial  institutions  is  measured  by  dividing 
Federal income taxes by net income which is equivalent to 
profits  before  taxes.  It is  not  taxable  income,  but  rather 
includes such  items as interest earned  on  state and  local 
government  obligations,  net  long-term  capital  gains, etc. 
Possible biases may occur in these ratios due to the timing 
of  gains  or  losses,  changes  in  depreciation  methods. 
differences in  amounts of  tax liabilities  actually paid  and 
tax estimates reported to financial regulatory agencies, etc., 
but  the  relationships  of  these  ratios  among  groups  of 
institutions  are  not  likely  to  be  altered.  Ratios  for 
commercial  banks and  mutual  savings  banks were 
computed from call and income report data reported to the 
F.D.I.C.  by  insured  institutions.  Ratios  for  savings  and 
loan associations were computed from figures published  by 
the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  in  Combined 
Financial Statements. 
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tax shelters utilized  by these institutions.  The 
use  of  tax  shelters by  commercial  banks and 
the resulting drop in their Federal  income tax 
burden was  examined  in  a  previous  article in 
this Re~iew.~  Finally,  the tax burdens of thrift 
institutions  and  commercial  banks  are 
compared and reasons are given for differences 
in their tax burdens. 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
THRIFT INSTITUTIONS 
Savings  and  loan  associations  and  mutual 
savings  banks  first  became  subject  to  the 
Federal corporate income tax laws in 1952.  In 
general, the base for taxable corporate income 
represents income from operating transactions, 
such  as interest  on  loans and securities,  etc., 
less  allowable  operating  expenses,  such  as 
salaries,  wages,  and  interest  paid  on  savings 
accounts, etc.  This figure  is  then  adjusted  to 
make  allowance  for  net  loan  losses  or 
recoveries,  net  securities  gains  or  losses,  loss 
carryover  and carryback  provisions,  and other 
modifications to income. Special tax provisions 
applying  to thrift  institutions  were  also 
,  instituted  in  1952.  The  most  notable  of  the 
special  provisions were the treatment of  gains 
and  losses  on  securities  transactions-which 
also  applied  to  commercial  banks-and  the 
treatment of additions to bad debt reserves for 
losses on loans. 
Federal Tax  Burden 
Although  thrift  institutions  became  subject 
to Federal corporate income tax laws  in  1952, 
their actual tax burden was quite small over the 
next  decade.  (See  Chart  1.)  Contributing  to 
their  modest  tax  burden  were  the  liberal 
provisions  regarding  transfers  to  bad  debt 
reserves.  Specifically,  thrift  institutions  were 
not subject to a tax liability on additions to bad 
debt reserves until these reserve funds reached 
2 See  Margaret  E.  Bedford,  "Income  Taxation  of 
Commercial  Banks," Monthly  Revrew.  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of Kansas C~ty,  July-August 1975, pp. 3-11. 
12  per  cent  of  their  total  savings  account 
balances.  Reflecting these  provisions,  insured 
savings and loan associations in 1962 paid out 
only $3.1  million  in  Federal taxes, or 0.4  per 
cent of net income,  while maintaining reserves 
and  undivided  profits of  $6.1  billion.  Insured 
mutual  savings  banks  in  1962  paid  $0.5 
million,  or  0.2  per  cent  of  net  income,  in 
Federal  income  taxes  and  carried  reserves, 
surplus, and undivided  profits accounts of $3.3 
billion. 
Realizing that allowable  tax-free transfers to 
reserves  were  unnecessarily  large,  Congress 
revised  the tax laws under the Revenue Act  of 
1962.  As  a  result,  taxes  paid  by  savings  and 
loan  associations rose to $93.1  million in  1963 
and their  tax  burden  rose sharply  to 12.2  per 
cent.  The  effective  tax  rate  paid  by  mutual 
savings banks showed  a  much  milder  increase 
to 2.0  per cent  as their  tax  payments  rose  to 
$3.4 million. Corporate tax rates were reduced 
in  1963,  but  no  other  major  tax  changes 
affecting  thrift  institutions  occurred  between 
1963 and 1968. During this period, though, the 
tax  burdens  for  both  savings  and  loan 
associations  and  mutual  savings  banks  rose 
moderately. 
Under the Revenue Act of  1969, substantial 
revisions were made in  the tax  laws governing 
financial institutions. These  revisions included 
changes  in  the  treatment  of  net  long-term 
capital  gains,  provisions  to  further  restrict 
additions  to  bad  debt  reserves,  and  the 
application  of  a  minimum  tax  on  those 
additions  as  well  as  on  other  items  of 
preference income. A surtax also was levied on 
all taxable income in  1968, 1969, and  the first 
half  of  1970,  and  tax  rates on  net  long-term 
capital  gains  on  securities  were  raised 
beginning in  1969. The Tax  Reduction  Act  of 
1975 lowered corporate tax rates on  income less 
than $50,000 for 1975 and 1976. 
As  a  result  of  the  1969 changes  in  the  tax 
structure. thrift institutions experienced a 
significant  increase  in  their  tax  burdens.  The 
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effective  tax  rate  for  savings  and  loan  TAX SWELTERS OF 
associations rose from 14.4 per cent in 1968 to  THRIFT INSTITUKOONS 
24.8  per cent  in  1974, and  the tax burden  of 
mutual savings  banks increased  from 3.3  per 
cent  to  16.9  per  cent  over  the  same  period.  Tax shelters are legal  methods of  using  tax 
However, the decline in  corporate tax rates in  accounting rules or intended  tax incentives  to 
1975  resulted  in  a  slight  reduction  in  tax  obtain  an  immediate  reduction  in  tax 
burdens. The effective tax rate for savings and  payments. Financial institutions  use a  number 
loan associations in 1975 was 24.0 per cent and  of these methods to reduce their tax liabilities. 
for  mutual  savings  banks  12.4  per  cent.  In  Tax  benefits  result  from  sheltering  income 
1975.  savings  and  loan  associations  paid  $0.5  through tax-free additions to reserves for future 
billion in  Federal taxes and  mutuals paid  $67  losses on loans, earning interest on tax-exempt 
million.  With  the  erosion  of  traditional  tax  municipal  securities,  and  managing  capital 
shelters and the rise in effective tax rates, thrift  gains  and  losses  to  obtain  maximum  tax 
institutions  sought  new  avenues  of  reducing  advantages. Tax reductions can also be realized 
taxable  income and  holding down  their  rising  by  deferring  tax  payments  to future  periods 
tax burdens.  through  such  methods  as  accelerated 
Monthly Review  0  June 1976  5 Federal Taxation of 
C^--...-l  _"__I-. __.  -.l-.____w---_.-"  .-_-__-_~-_--.  -  I----  "X^T-  -  -  ------.----^^Ix--,-  - 
%'  -  ., .  > 
'  -*" 
"  ,. 
V"  .  ',' ,  ,-  , 
Tabl= I 




Interest  on state and local securities 
Sav~ngs  and loan assoclattons 
Mutual savlngs  banks 
Commerc~al  banks 
Bad debt  losses on loans* 
Sav~ngs  and loan assaclattons 
Mutual  savlngs  banks 
Commerclal banks 
Gross  depreciation? 
Savlngs  and loan assockatlons 
Mutual  savings  banks 





























Cred~ts  or. 
.  .  Add~tional  ~aLbs 
,  . 
.* ,  .  a*  '-  , 
,  ..  . 
,  -  - 
'Investment  tax credit 
Savlngs  and loan assoclatlons 
Mutual savings banks 
Commerclal banks 
Foreign tax credit  , 
,i"'~avings and loan assoc~at~ons 
."~utual  savings  bants  '" 
Commercial banks 
Minimum tax  on preference items 
Sav~ngs  and  loan  assoclatlons 
Mutual  savings  banks 





















'Bad  debts for savings and  loan associations and  mutLal savings banks were estimated from  changes in 
reserve accounts and  thus may  reflect changes  in  reserves for  reasons 'other than  transfers to loan  loss 
reserves. 
tDepreciation deductions cannot be separated between normal depreciation for ordinary bank assets and 
accelerated depreciation nor can depreciation on  leased assets be determined. 
*The calculation of  the percentage increase in taxes assumes a marginaktax rate of  48 per cent applicable 
to all  institutions. Insofar as ~ome~banks  would ,have been  subject  to.lower tax  rates, the tax  benef~ts 
, .  scown would  be overestimates.  . -  - .. . 
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depreciation. In addition, tax payments may be 
reduced  by  utilizing  tax  credits  such  as  the 
investment and foreign tax credits. Such credits 
result in  a  dollar-for-dollar reduction in taxes 
since  they  are  deducted  directly  from  the 
amount of  tax  payable,  rather than from  net 
income before the tax rate is applied. 
The  relative  importance  of  several  tax 
shelters  to  financial  institutions  in  1973  is 
shown  in  Table  1.  As  can  be  seen,  thrift 
institutions  realized  the  largest  tax  benefits 
from  transfers  to  bad  debt  reserves,  while 
commercial  banks utilized  tax-free interest  on 
municipal securities as their major tax shelter. 
Gross depreciation resulted in a significant tax 
saving  for  all  financial  institutions,  but  the 
amount of sheitered  income  is  not as large as 
the  figures  shown.  Depreciation  cannot  bc 
separated  between that on  assets  used  directly 
in  bank  operations  and  that on  leased  assets 
nor can the amount of accelerated depreciation 
be  ascertained  from  the  available  data. 
Depreciation on regular plant and equipment is 
an expense of doing business, while accelerated 
depreciation and depreciation realized  through 
leasing operations reflect, at least in  part, a tax 
shelter. The tax  benefits  from  the investment 
and foreign tax credits were very small for thrift 
institutions  but represented  significant  savings 
for commercial banks. 
Transfers  to  Bad  Debt  Reserves.  Thrift 
institutions,  as  well  as  other  taxpayers,  are 
allowed z deduction for bad debts in arriving at 
taxable  income.  This  deduction  may  be 
calculated under the specific charge-off method 
or  on  the  reserve  method.  The  specific 
charge-off method allows institutions to deduct 
actual losses from, or add recoveries to, taxable 
6  Federal Reserve  Bank of  Kansas C~ty income  in  the year  they occurred.  Few  thrift 
institutions  use this method, however, because 
the  reserve method  generally  provides  greater 
tax savings.  Under the reserve method,  losses 
are charged  against  a  reserve  account  rather 
than income and recoveries are credited to the 
reserve. Thrifts are able to make a  reasonable 
addition  to  these  reserve  accounts  for  future 
losses on loans, and the net amount transferred 
is a deduction from taxable income.  Tax codes 
specify the meaning of "reasonable" additions 
for  thrift  institutions,  and  these  definitions 
have changed over time. 
From 1952 to 1962, tax provisions regarding 
allowable transfers to bad debt reserves were so 
lenient  that savings  and loan  associations and 
mutual savings  banks paid  very  little  Federal 
income  taxes.  The  definition  of  reasonable 
additions to reserves,  however,  was changed  in 
1962 and again in 1969. These changes resulted 
in  significant  increases  in  the  taxes  paid  by 
thrift institutions. 
Table  2  shows  the  allowable  methods  of 
calculating reserve additions under the Revenue 
Act  of  1962 and the Tax Reform  Act of  1969. 
In  general, thrift institutions have been allowed 
to  make additions to a  reserve  on  qualifying 
loans and to a reserve on  nonqualifying loans. 
Qualifying  loans  pertain  to  loans  secured  by 
improved  real  property,  mobile  homes,  etc., 
while  nonqualifying  loans  are  unsecured  or 
other than qualifying loans.  Tax-free  transfers 
to the qualifying loan reserve can be computed 
under one of  three options-the percentage of 
income method, the experience method, or the 
bank percentage method. Reserve additions for 
nonqualifying  loans  must  be  based  on  the 
loss experience  for  recent  years.  Of  the  three 
methods  available,  the  percentage  of  income 
method  is  used  by  the majority of savings and 
loan  associations,  while  the  bank  percentage 
method is the second most frequently used.' 
The percentage of  income method allows an 
institution  to  iransfer  a  portion  of  taxable 
income  to  reserves.  Under  this  method,  from 
Financial Institutions 
1962 to 1969,  an  institution  could  transfer  up 
to 60  per  cent  of  its  taxable  income  to the 
tax-free reserve. The Tax Reform  Act of  1969, 
however, reduced this percentage to 40 per cent 
over  a 10-year  phase-in  period. The allowable 
percentage fell by 3 per cent per year from 1970 
to 1972, by  2 per cent from 1973 to 1976, and 
will  be  reduced  by  1 per  cent  from  1977  to 
1979, and remain at 40 per cent thereafter. 
The experience  method allows an institution 
to deduct an amount based on actual losses in 
recent years. The amount is also related to the 
volume of  qualifying  loans outstanding  at the 
end  of  the  year.  More  specifically,  the 
experience method allows a deduction equal to 
the volume of  loans outstanding at the end of 
the  year  times  a  certain  percentage.  The 
percentage  is  based  on  the ratio of  losses  on 
loans for the most recent 6 years to the amount 
of loans outstanding at the end of  those years. 
Prior  to 1969,  the  provision  was  more  liberal 
in  that the number of  years  used  to calculate 
the percentage was equal to the average life of 
the institution's qualifying loans. 
The bank percentage method, also known as 
the  percentage  of  loans  method,  allows  an 
addition to reserves in an amount necessary to 
bring  the  total  reserve  up  to  a  specified 
percentage of qualifying loans. This percentage 
was 1.8 per cent in 1969-75, will be 1.2 per cent 
in 1976-81, 0.6 per cent in 1982-87, and will be 
the percentage computed under the experience 
method  after  1987.  Prior  to  1969,  thrift 
institutions were allowed to transfer an amount 
necessary to increase the reserve to 3 per cent of 
qualifying loans outstanding at the end of  the 
year. 
To  be  eligible  for  these  bad  debt  reserve 
deductions,  an  institution  must  meet  certain 
criteria. Basica,lly, an institution's  business  has 
3 Edward  J. Kane  and  John  S.  Valentine,  "Income-Tax 
Payments  by  Savings-and-Loan  Associations  Before  and 
After the Tax  Reform  Act  of  1969," Working  Paper No. 
45,  Office  of  Economic  Research,  Federal  Home  Loan 
Bank  Board, October 1973. 
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Table 2 
METHODS OF COMFJPBDTONQ  TAX 
DEDUCTIBLE ADDOTUgDN8 80  BAD DEBT 
W  ESQRVES  OF TW  WUFU UNS'UBUUUOONS 
Revenue Act of  1962-October  16,  1962.  to July 12,  1969 
I.  Savlngs  and Loan  Associations 
A.  Reserve  addlt~ons  for nonqualifying loans (all loans other than  qualifying loans  below) 
1.  Experience method-allows a maximum  addit~on  of 
of losses  on  unsecured loans  for a number  of 
at  the  end of  the 
sum  of  nonquallfylng loans  at  the  end of  each  year 
current  year 
*The number  of  years  used  is  equal  to the average  life of the fnstitution's nonqualifying loans. 
B.  Reserve  addltlons  for  qualifying loans (loans secured by an  Interest in improved real property or  by an 
interest in real  property  whlch is  to be  Improved out of  the  proceeds  of  the  loan) 
1.  Experience method-same as  A above  uslng quallfylng loans 
2.  Percentage of lncome method-allows a maximum add~tion  of 60 per cent of taxable Incomet less 
the amount transferred ~n  A above. 
Llmitatlons: 
a)  A net operating loss  cannot be  created by the deduction 
b)  The  reserve cannot exceed 6 per cent of quallfytng loans outstandlng at the end of the year. 
C)  The reserve addltlon cannot exceed 12 per  cent of the difference between total deposlts at 
the close of the year and surplus, undlvlded proflts, and reserves at the beglnn~ng  of the year. 
d)  The  association must  pr~marlly  engage  ~n  acqulrlng savtngs  of  the publlc and tnvesttng In 
certain loans.  Most  notably thls requlred that at least 82 per cent of an  ~nstltutlon's  total 
assets  be  represented by  residentlal mortgages,  cash,  government securltles, and passbook 
loans. 
3.  Percentage  of  real  property  loans method --  allows a maxlmum transfer of  the amount necessary 
to Increase the reserve  to 3 per cent of  such  loans outstandlng at the close of the year.* 
Llmitatlons: See  c and d under B2 above. 
II.  Mutual  Savlngs Banks-same as  for I above except under  82, l~mltatlon  d, 72 per cent of an  ~nstltut~on's  Invest- 
ments  had  to be  ~n  the  specifted categorles. 
tTaxable Income is computed before any net operating loss carryback and deductions for bsd debts, chantable contrlbu- 
tlons, and certaln other  Items. 
*Noncapltal  stock companies In operation less than 10 years were allowed an addltlonal amount 
§Taxable Income 1s  computed before the deduct~on  for bad debt reserve addltlons and by excluding from gross lncome 
net galns from the sale of certaln stocks and bonds.318 of net long-term capltal galns, dlvldends, and some other Items 
of Income. The  portlon of  the nonqual~fylng  reserve  add~tlon  that must be  deducted 1s equal to the  ratlo of  18 per 
cent  (28 per cent for  a mutual  savlngs bank) to the percentage of assets  In nonspeclfled categorles 
to consist of acquiring savings of the public and  securities, and passbook loans. Under the 1969 
investing  them  in  certain  loans  and  assets  Tax  Reform  Act,  this  rule  was  relaxed 
within specified limits. Most notably, the latter  somewhat  and  allowed  an  institution  not 
restriction requires that at least 82 per cent of a  meeting the full asset requirements to deduct a 
savings and  loan association's investments and  portion of taxable income according to a sliding 
72  per  cent  for  a  mutual  savings  bank  be  in  scale. That is, the percentage of taxable income 
residential  mortgages,  cash,  government  deductible  declines as the percentage  of assets 
8  Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City Financial Institutions 
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METHODS 06  COWBaOTlNG TAX 
DIEDUGTUBBE  ADDBB18N8 80  BAD DEBT 
RESFRVES OF THRIFT BedSTBTUBIONS 
Tax Reform Act of 1969-after July 12,  1969 
II  I.  Savings and Loan  Associations 
A.  Reserve additions for nonqualifying loans 
1.  Experience method'allows  a maximum addition of  . 
,,  , 
of losses on no:nqualifying loans in the  mo_st.current 6 years 
-.  at  the  end of 
sum of  unsecured loans outstanding at the' end of each  year 
the current  year 
B  Reserve  additions for qualifying loans (loans secured by real property, mobile homes, urban renewal, and 
certain other loans) 
1.  Experience methodkame as  A above using qualifying loans. 
2.  Percentage of Income method-allows a maximum addit~on  of the applicable percentage of taxable 
lncome less  the amount transferred In A above  where the applicable percentage  is: 
60%- in 1969  49% in..l973  42% in  1977  ".  :  57% ~n  1970  47% ln"l 974  41% in 1978 
.5b% ~n  1971  45%' iri::1975  40% in 1979 and thereafter 
.  .. 
,51%-  in 1972  43%'in 1976 
I  . 
Llmitatlons: 
a)  See  IB2a. b,  and  c.  . .  . , 
b)  An institution-had to meet the requirements of IB2d, but the percentage of incomededuct- 
~ble  would be  reduced by  % of 1 per  cent  for each  percentage  that  quallfylng assets  fell 
below 82 per  cent.  Qualifying assets  cannot  fall  below 60 per  cent of  total assets. 
3.  Bank  percentage or  percentage  of  qual~fy~n-g.!oans  method-allows a maximum addition  of  an 
amount  necessary  to Increase  the  reserve  at  the  end of  the  year  to the applicable percentage of 
eligible loans outstanding at the end of  the year less the amount transfer'red  in A above,  where the 
appl~cable  percentage is: 
L  I 
.  ,  , . 
1  1.8% in 1969-75  ',  0.6% in  1982-87 
1.2%1n1976-81  " The percentage computed under 
the experience method~from  1988 
-  and thereafter. 
Limltatlons: See  IB2c. 
IV.  Mutual  Savlngs Banks-same  as  Ill  above  except under  82, l~mitation  b, the percentage of  lncome deduction is 
reduced by 1.5 per cent for each-  1-  per cent difference between 72 per cent of total assets and assets held in the 
specffted categories. The specified assets  must be at least 50 per cent of total assets before 1973 and 60 per cent 
t.  after 1973 to use  the percentagel,of Income method.  ,  *-  ,  .  - 
, ..  , C  , .. '*.  .  . 
'.  0,  *'  + ;  I  ._. 
>.  , 
in  the specified categories declines. However, a 
thrift institution holding less than 60 per  cent 
of assets in the specified categories is  ineligible 
for the percentage of income method. 
Reflecting the  tax  changes  made  in  1962, 
bad  debt reserve  deductions  taken  by  savings 
and  loan  associations fell  by  nearly  one-third 
from 1962 to 1963. As a result, the effective tax 
rate of savings and loans rose from 0.4 per cent 
to  12.2 per  cent. After the  1969  tax  revision, 
the  bad  debt  reserves  of  savings  and  loans 
posted  an  increase  in  dollar  terms,  but  fell 
substantially as  a per  cent of taxable income. 
As  a result, the effective tax rate in  1971  was 
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about 10 percentage  points  higher  than would 
have  prevailed  under  the  provisions  prior  to 
1969. 
In  addition  to  the  changes  in  the 
computation of  bad debt reserves for financial 
institutions,  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1969 
instituted a  minimum tax on  preference items 
of income. Tax preferences include accelerated 
depreciation  on  real  property  and  personal 
property subject to a net lease, amortization of 
certain  facilities,  stock  options,  depletion, 
capital  gains,  and  reserves  for  losses  on  bad 
debts of  financial institutions. These items are 
subject to a second round of taxation at a flat 
rate of 10 per cent after an exclusion of $30,000 
plus all Federal taxes paid during the year. The 
imposition  of  this  tax  was  important  to 
financial  institutions  because  of  their  large 
reserves for losses on bad debts. The minimum 
tax  rate applies  to the amount  by  which  the 
"reasonable" addition  to the  reserve  for  the 
taxable  year  exceeds  the  amount  that  would 
have  been  allowed  if  the institution  had  used 
the  experience  method.  Excess  bad  debt 
reserves  account  for  nearly  all  of  thrifts' 
preference items.  For the 1970-73  period,  this 
second round of taxation on preference income 
raised the effective tax rates of savings and loan 
associations about 2 percentage points. 
The continuing erosion of  tax-free additions 
to bad debt reserves and the imposition  of  the 
tax on  preference items contributed  greatly to 
the upward trend of thrift institutions'  effective 
tax rates.  However,  the sliding scale  provision 
for  using  the  percentage  of  income  method 
allows  institutions  to  diversify  their  assets  to 
utilize other tax shelters while still obtaining a 
significant  benefit  from  the  bad  debt 
deduction.  For  example,  when  the  full 
reduction  in  the  allowable  percentage  of 
taxable  income  has  taken  place  in  1979,  an 
institution maintaining only the minimum level 
of  qualifying  assets,  60  per  cent,  could  still 
shelter  nearly one-fourth of  its taxable  income 
through transfers to bad debt reserves. 
Other Tax  Shelters. The decline  in  the tax 
advantages obtained  by  transferring  funds  to 
bad  debt  reserves  and  the imposition  of  the 
minimum tax on those reserve  additions  have 
encouraged  thrift  institutions  to  seek  other 
methods of tax reductions. 
One approach open to thrift institutions has 
been  to increase  their  holdings of  tax-exempt 
state  and  local  securities.  Holdings  of  these 
assets, however, represent only a small portion 
of  the asset  portfolios of  thrift  institutions.  In 
1975,  state and  local  securities  accounted  for 
less  than 1.5  per  cent  of  the  total  assets  for 
both  savings  and  loans  and  mutual  savings 
banks. In many cases  municipal  securities are 
held  only  to  help  satisfy  regulatory  liquidity 
requirements.  Nonetheless,  tax-free  income 
from  state  and  local  obligations  can  be  a 
significant  aid  in  reducing  taxable  income, 
particularly  for  large  institutions.  For 
institutions in  the highest tax bracket, there is 
generally  a  greater  after-tax  return  from 
tax-exempt securities  even  though  the  pretax 
return  may  be  considerably  lower  than  on 
taxable securities. Smaller institutions, though, 
may  find  it  more  advantageous  to  invest  in 
higher  yielding  taxable securities,  particularly 
when costs of selling securities are considered. 
Another tax advantage for thrift  institutions 
can arise from securities transactions.  In  1952. 
thrift  institutions  were  granted  the same  tax 
advantages as commercial banks with regard to 
the  sale  or  exchange  of  securities.  Financial 
institutions were allowed to treat net long-term 
gains  on  sales  of  securities  as  capital  gains 
while treating net long-term losses as ordinary 
deductions from income. Thus, if  an institution 
in  the highest tax  bracket  alternated  years  of 
taking  gains  and  losses,  its  gains  would  be 
taxed at the lower capital gains rate of  25  per 
cent  and  about  half  of  its  losses  would  be 
absorbed by  the Internal Revenue Service. The 
Tax  Reform  Act  of  1969  required  that  thrift 
institutions  treat  both  gains  and  losses  on 
securities  and  mortgage  sales  as  ordinary 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City Financial  Institutions 
income  and  thus  reduced  the  benefits  from 
alternating years of gains and losses, although 
it did not entirely eliminate those benefits. 
Prior  to  1969,  thrift  institutions  obtained 
another  benefit  from  securities  transactions. 
Long-term  capital  gains  were  included  in 
taxable income when using the 60 per cent  of 
taxable income deduction for  computing  bad 
debt reserves. Thus, long-term gains increased 
the  bad  debt  deduction  when  reserves  were 
below  ceiling  levels.  In  many  cases,  this 
reduction in taxes more than offset the increase 
in taxes from the 25 per cent rate applied to the 
net  long-term  capital  gain.4 Since  1969,  the 
percentage  of  income  method  for  computing 
bad debt reserves requires thrift institutions to 
exclude from  taxable income a  portion of  net 
long-term capital gains for the taxable year. In 
addition,  capital  gains  are  considered  a 
preference item and are therefore subject to the 
minimum tax rate. These changes in  tax laws 
regarding  security  transactions  further  served 
to  erode  tax  advantages  of  thrift  institutions 
and contributed to the rise in their tax burdens. 
Beginning in 1962, corporations were allowed 
to take a credit against taxes for investment  in 
new equipment and machinery. The credit was 
equal to 7 per cent of  the full amount of  such 
investments.= However, thrift institutions  were 
limited to a credit on only 50 per cent of  their 
qualifying  investment  up  to  a  maximum  of 
$12,500  plus  the  applicable  percentage  over 
that  amount.  The  investment  tax  credit  was 
raised  to  10  per  cent  for  the  period  from 
January 22, 1975, through December 31, 1976, 
Federul  Irlcome  Taxation  of  Banks  and Financial 
Irtsrirurions. Warren. Gorham, and  Lamont,  Inc., Boston, 
1971. 
5 The amount of the investment to which the credit applies 
is $25.000 plus 25 per cent of all amounts over that (50 per 
cent  for years  after  March  10,  1967).  The  investment  tax 
credit has remained in effect except for two short  periods of 
suspension  from  October  1966  to  March  1967  and  from 
April  1969  to  December  1970.  During  the  first  period, 
$20.000  of  new  investment  was  exempted  from  the 
suspension. 
but thrift institutions still receive only half the 
credit.  Thus,  the  investment  tax  credit  has 
resulted  in  a  smaller  tax  benefit  to  thrift 
institutions than to other  corporation^.^ 
The  justification  for  thrifts'  smaller 
investment  tax credit  allowance was  that they 
were already given generous tax benefits under 
the special provisions for transfers to bad debt 
reserves. Thrift institutions also receive smaller 
investment  credit  benefits  than  commercial 
banks and other corporations  because  they  do 
not  engage directly  in  leasing activities  which 
allow investment  tax credits. Still,  investment 
tax  credit  deductions  may  have  encouraged 
thrift  institutions  to  invest  in  expensive 
computer  equipment  and  expand  their 
electronic  funds transfer operations  rapidly in 
recent years. 
Thrift institutions take almost no foreign tax 
credits.  Savings and loan associations are  not 
engaged in foreign  activities or branching and 
only a small number of  mutual savings  banks 
operate in  this area. 
COMPARISON OF THE TAX BURDEN 
OF THRIFT INSTITUTIONS 
AND COMMERCIAL BANKS 
As shown in Chart 1, the Federal tax burden 
for savings  and  loan  associations  and  mutual 
savings  banks  has  risen  sharply  since  1962. 
while the tax burden for commercial banks has 
declined. As  a consequence, the tax burden in 
1975 was  24.0  per  cent  for  savings  and  loan 
associations,  12.4  per cent for  mutual savings 
banks,  and  13.5  per  cent  for  commercial 
banks. 
Differences  in  the  tax  laws  for  thrifts  and 
commercial banks do not appear to be a prime 
6 Thrift  institutions can  receive the  full  investment credit 
on purchases made by  a service corporation or  subsidiary. 
Service  corporations  have  grown  since  1970  when  the 
Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  relaxed  restrictions  on 
their  activities.  Leasing  activities  of  savings  and  loan 
associations  are  usually  carried  on  through  these 
subsidiaries. 
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factor  accounting  for  the  differences  in  tax 
burdens  at  the  present  time.  Available  tax 
shelters  are  generally  the  same  for  thrift 
institutions  and  commercial  banks,  and  tax 
laws  regarding  these  shelters  are  similar  in 
many ways for both groups. 
One minor difference in the tax laws is in the 
treatment of  bad debt deductions.  From  1954 
to  1964,  commercial  banks  were  permitted 
rather generous additions to bad debt reserves,' 
as were thrift institutions in the 1952-62 period. 
Beginning in  1965,  though, tax laws  applying 
to  banks  were  made  more  restrictive,  with 
banks  allowed  to  build  up  reserves  equal  to 
only 2.4 per cent of eligible  loans outstanding 
or to use the experience method based on losses 
over  the  past  6  years.  Under  the  1969  Tax 
Reform  Act,  tax  laws  regarding  bad  debt 
reserves  were  equalized  for  thrift  institutions 
and  commercial  banks,  but  thrifts  meeting 
certain  asset  requirements  could  choose  a 
percentage  of  income  method  which  usually 
resulted in larger tax deductions. 
Another minor difference in the taxlaws for 
the tie groups ,relates to -the  investment  tax 
credit.  ~ommercial  banks,.  are allowed the full 
investment  credit,  as  are  other  ~&~orations, 
while thrift institutions are allowed only half of 
the credit. Thus, differences in tax laws for the 
two groups are few and essentially minor. How, 
then, is it possible that commercial banks have 
reduced  their  tax  burdens  while  effective  tax 
rates paid by savings and loan associations and 
mutual savings banks have increased? 
A principal reason for the marked difference 
in  the trends in  the tax burdens of  thrifts and 
commercial  banks  relates  to  the  ability  of 
institutions  to  utilize  available  tax  shelters. 
Generally  speaking,  the  ability  to  utilize  tax 
shelters is  associated  with the asset structure of 
Loan  losses  were  calculated  by  an  experience  method 
u\ing a  20-year  average. This average  often  included  the 
Depress~on years  of  the  1930's  when  loan  losses  were 
h~\tor~cally  high  and  resulted  in  bad  debt  deductions 
greatly in  excess of banks' recent experience. 
the institution and the flexibility it has to shift 
assets to capitalize on tax shelters or substitute 
new tax advantages for eroding shelters.  Thrift 
institutions, for example, are primarily engaged 
in mortgage lending activities.  Mortgage  loans 
accounted for 82 per cent of  savings  and loan 
associations'  total  assets  in  1975,  while  other 
loans and securities  amounted  to only 9.2 per 
cent of  their  portfolios.  Mutual savings  banks 
were  somewhat  more  diversified  with  64  per 
cent of their assets invested  in  mortgage  loans 
and 31.6 per cent in other loans and securities. 
Thus, thrift institutions  are largely  limited  to 
the  use  of  tax  shelters  related  to  mortgage 
loans-at  the present  time only  the bad  debt 
reserve deduction is such a shelter. Commercial 
banks, however, held only 14.2 per cent of their 
assets in mortgage loans in 1975 with 42.4 per 
cent of  their portfolio  in  other loans  and  23.5 
per  cent  in  investment  securities.  Thus, 
commercial banks are able to utilize a number 
of  the  tax  shelters  available  to  financial 
institutions.  In  addition,  laws other  than  tax 
codes  can  affect  an  institution's  ability  to  use 
tax shelters. Regulations regarding involvement 
in  foreign  and  leasing  operations  are  more 
liberal  for  commercial  banks  than  for  thrift 
institutions,  thus  affording  banks  the 
opportunity  for  greater  tax  credits  and 
tax-sheltered depreciation deductions. 
To  gain  further  insight  into  reasons  for 
differences  in  effective  tax  rates  among 
financial  institutions,  it  is  useful  to  examine 
relative  tax  burdens  by  size  of  institution.  In 
1970,  for  example,  all  size  groups of  savings 
and  loan  associations  and  mutual  savings 
banks  paid  lower  effective  Federal  tax  rates 
than equivalent  commercial  bank size  groups. 
By  1975,  though,  the  picture  had  changed 
dramatically.  As  Chart  2  shows,  savings  and 
loan  associations  in  all  asset  size  categories 
except  the  smallest  had  a  higher  tax  burden 
than commercial banks. In  the case of  mutual 
savings  banks, a similar  but slightly  different 
picture emerges. Commercial banks had  lower 
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tax  burdens  than  mutual  savings  banks  with 
the  exception  of  two  asset  size  categories. 
Mutual  savings  banks  with  assets  over  $250 
million  had  a  tax  burden  below  that  of 
commercial banks, while savings  banks in  the 
$10-$25 million asset category had a tax burden 
below commercial banks but the difference was 
negligible. 
The  lower  tax  burden  for  small  thrift 
institutions  points  out  the  importance  of  the 
bad  debt  reserve  deduction  for  these 
institutions  vis-a-vis  commercial  banks.  Small 
commercial banks, it  has  been  found, tend  to 
utilize  few  tax  shelters.  Moreover,  many  of 
these  institutions  use  the  specific  charge-off 
method  of  accounting  for  loan  losses  rather 
than the reserve method which provides greater 
tax  reductions.  Small  commercial  banks  also 
are  rarely  engaged  in  foreign  or  leasing 
activities  and  the  tax  reductions  obtained 
through  securities  swaps  or  investment  in 
municipal securities are often minimal because 
of  the  banks'  lower  tax  bracket.  In contrast, 
small thrift institutions normally use the reserve 
method of  accounting for loan  losses and  thus 
realize reductions in their tax burdens. Most of 
these  smaller  thrift  institutions  pay  no 
minimum  tax  on  their  bad  debt  transfers 
because  of  the  large  exemption  given  on 
preference income. Thus, the bad debt reserve 
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deduction  is  an  important  factor  in  allowing 
small  thrift  institutions  to  post  lower  tax 
burdens than small commercial banks. 
As shown in Chart 2, larger savings and loan 
associations pay higher effective tax rates than 
similar  sized  commercial  banks.  For  savings 
and loan associations, the tax burden generally 
increases  with  the  size  of  institution.  For 
commercial banks, in contrast, the tax burden 
declines as bank size increases up to the largest 
bank size. 
The rise  in  the  tax  burden  of  savings  and 
loan associations as size increases results partly 
from the progressive nature of the corporate tax 
structure and partly from the second round  of 
taxation on preference income.  The corporate 
tax rate in  1975 was  20  per  cent  on  the first 
$25,000  of  taxable  income,  22  per  cent  on 
income of $25,000 to $50,000, and 48 per cent 
on  all  income  over  $50,000.8  Despite  this 
progressive  tax  structure,  however,  the  tax 
burden of savings and loans peaked  in  the $50 
to $100 million range during the late 1960's, as 
larger institutions  were  more  efficient  in 
sheltering  their  income  than  smaller 
institutions.  With  the  implementation  of  the 
minimum tax in 1969, though, the tax burdens 
also  increased  for  the  larger  institutions.  In 
1971,  the minimum tax on  preference  income 
raised the effective tax rate only 0.1 per cent for 
savings and  loan  associations with  total assets 
less than $10 million,  but the tax burden was 
increased to 2.3 per cent for associations with 
over $100 million in assets. 
The  general  decline  in  the  tax  burden  of 
commercial banks as size increases results from 
the relatively small impact of the minimum tax 
and  the  increasing  ability  to  shelter  income. 
The  largest  tax  advantage  for  commercial 
banks is derived  from investment in  municipal 
securities and this interest income is not subject 
to  the  minimum  tax.  Also,  as size  increases, 
8 From 1965 to 1974, the corporate tax rate was 22 per cent 
on  the  tint 925.000 of  taxable  income and 48  per cent on 
Income over $25,000. 
banks have  greater  flexibility  to shift  to tax- 
sheltered activities and are better able to utilize 
accounting  and  tax  experts  to  reduce  tax 
liabilities. Not only have the larger banks been 
able to utilize  the traditional  tax shelters  for 
financial institutions,  but they  have  also 
adopted  other  tax  savings  programs  such  as 
accelerating  depreciation,  offering  equipment 
leasing  programs,  taking  investment  and 
foreign tax credits, and benefiting from merger 
and  holding  company  accounting  rules. 
Although  the  effective  tax  rate  of  banks 
generally falls as bank size increases,  banks in 
the largest  asset  size  category  experienced  a 
slightly  rising tax burden.  This tendency 
appears to reflect the effects of  the progressive 
corporate  income  tax  structure  and  the  fact 
that the largest banks held a smaller proportion 
of assets in municipal securities than did banks 
in other size groups. 
As  thrift institutions diversify their activities 
and  as  their  size  increases,  they  too  can  be 
expected  to make greater  use  of  available  tax 
shelters. There is  some evidence  that  this shift 
has already begun. In the 1971-74 period, when 
tax laws were not changed, the general  rise  in 
tax  burdens  tended  to fall  as  size  increased. 
Tax burdens rose 6.6 per cent for savings  and 
loan  associations  with  assets  of  $10  to  $25 
million  but  increased  only  3.6  per  cent  for 
associations with assets over $100 million. This 
pattern  was  interrupted  in  1975  since  the 
changes  in  corporate  tax  ratcs  benefited 
medium-sized  institutions  more  than  larger 
institutions. The shift to the greater use of tax 
shelters other  than  bad  debt  reserve  transfers 
has also taken  place at mutual savings  banks, 
particularly  the  larger  ones.  Mutual  savings 
banks increased the percentage of  interest-free 
income from municipal securities to net income 
before taxes from  2.7 per cent in  1971  to 13.9 
per  cent  in  1975.  This  ratio  rose  even  more 
rapidly  at  large  mutuals,  enabling  them  to 
reduce  their  tax  burden  below  that  paid  by 
medium-sized mutual savings banks. Thus, tax 
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laws and the use of tax shelters can affect  not 
only the share of the tax burden among varying 
types  of  institutions  but  also  the  tax  burden 
among various size groups within the same type 
of institution. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Changes in tax laws, since 1962 have resulted 
in  an erosion  of  the tax shelters  available  to 
thrift institutions and led to a sharp increase in 
their  Federal  tax burden. The tax burden for 
savings and loan associations was 24.0 per cent 
in  1975 and  for  mutual  savings  banks it  was 
12.4 per cent. Commercial banks, on the other 
hand,  experienced  a  reduction  in  their  tax 
burden to 13.5 per cent in  1975. Tax burdens, 
however,  vary  greatly  with  the  size  of  the 
institution.  Smaller  commercial  banks  and 
mutual  savings  banks  do  not  benefit  as 
significantly  from  tax shelters as larger banks, 
while  large  savings  and  loan  associations  pay 
higher tax rates than smaller institutions. 
Recently proposed changes in tax laws could 
greatly alter the relative tax burden of financial 
institutions. One such major proposal is a plan 
for  a  mortgage tax  credit.'  This credit  would 
allow  a  deduction  from  taxes  equal  to  a 
percentage of  an  institution's  residential 
mortgage interest income. Since thrifts already 
hold  a  large  proportion  of  their  assets  in 
mortgages, they  would  probably  benefit  more 
from this credit  than commercial  banks. 
Another  proposal  that  could  alter  the 
comparative tax advantage of  commercial 
banks  is  a  Federal  subsidy  for  interest 
payments of  state and local  governments 
issuing  taxable  securities.  According  to  the 
proposal, the subsidy would be greater than or 
equal  to  the  difference  in  interest  costs  on 
taxable  and  nontaxable  securities  so  as  to 
encourage  municipalities  to issue  the taxable 
securities  in  favor  of  tax-exempts.1°  To  the 
extent  this  occurs,  commercial -banks  would  - 
have less opportunity to earn tax-free income. 
Thus,  the  combination  of  the  mortgage  tax 
credit and the elimination  of  tax-exempt 
municipal income could greatly reduce the tax 
burden of thrifts relative to that of commercial 
banks. 
9 With  the  institution  of  a  mortgage  tax  credit,  the 
percentage  of  income  method  of  computing  thrifts'  bad 
debt  reserves  would  be  eliminated,  and  all  financial 
institutions  would use  the experience  or bank  percentage 
reserve methods. However, the Treasury has estimated that 
the mortgage tax credit would result in a greater tax benefit 
to thrift institutions than the current bad  debt  deduction. 
See Statements to House Budget CommitteeTask Force on 
Tax  Expenditures  at  Hearing.  February  25,  1976.  on 
Proposed Mortgage Interest Tax Credit. 
10 See  Joint  Committee  on  Internal  Revenue  Taxation 
Report in  House Ways and Means Committee Hearings on 
HR 12774,  March 30, 1976. 
Monthly Review  * June 1976 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
Part II: Programs and Problems 
By Steven P. Zell 
P 
opular  interest  in  the  operations  and 
objectives of the unemployment  insurance 
(UI) system tends to vary directly with the state 
of the economy. While even in the best of times 
over 1 million claims for benefits are processed 
nationally  each  week,  the  system  has  rarely 
been a subject of  national debate. However, in 
recessionary periods, when unemployment rises 
and  the  financial  resources  and  claims 
processing capacity of the system are strained, 
questions  are  increasingly  raised  as  to  the 
proper  role  and  characteristics  of  the  UI 
program. 
Beginning in  the third  quarter of 1974,  the 
United States experienced its most rapid rise in 
unemployment since the end of  World  War 11. 
Because much of this increased joblessness was 
among  wage  and  salary  workers  with 
unemployment  insurance  eligibility,  the  UI 
system  soon  experienced  an  unprecedented 
drain  on  its  resources.  As  unemployment 
continued to grow and more and more workers 
exhausted  their  regular  unemployment  bene- 
fits, Congress enacted new programs to extend 
the  duration  of  benefits  and  to  expand  UI 
coverage  to  previously  excluded  groups  of 
workers.  This  tremendous  growth  in  benefit 
payments has resulted  in the bankruptcy of 20 
state  programs,  extensive  borrowing  by  these 
states from  the Federal  Government,  the 
introduction  before Congress of several  bills to 
significantly  revamp  the  system,  and 
considerable  debate  on  the  future  of 
unemployment insurance. 
This article is the second part of a three-part 
study  which  attempts  to  clarify  the  issues 
involved  in  the  current  debate  on  the 
unemployment  insurance  system.'  Expanding 
on  the  discussion  of  the  programs  and 
procedures of the UI system  presented in  Part 
I, this article begins with an examination of the 
disparity which exists among the states in  their 
regular benefit  programs.  It concludes  with  a 
discussion  of  the  extended  benefit  and 
expanded  coverage  programs  which  were 
placed  in  effect  during  the  recent  recession. 
The final  article in  this series, to appear in  a 
subsequent Monthly Review, will discuss some 
of  the  major  criticisms  and  problems  of  the 
system  and some of  the  proposed  solutions to 
these problems. 
REGULAR STATE PROGRAMS: 
VARIATIONS ON A THEME 
The  Federal-state  system  of  unemployment 
compensation has grown tremendously since its 
creation  during  the  Great  Depression.  The 
Division  of  Actuarial  Services  of  the  United 
"Unemployment  Insurance  Part  I:  Programs  and 
Procedures." was  published  in  the  February  1976  issue  of 
this  Review.  It  examined  the  history,  objectives, 
terminology,  and  procedures  of  the  UI  system,  with 
particular  emphasis  on  the  operation  of  the  Missouri 
Division of Employment Security. 
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States Unemployment Insurance Service  (UIS) 
estimates  that  in  fiscal  year  1976,  benefit 
payments  for  all  programs  will  exceed  $18 
billion, approximately 8 times the benefits paid 
only 10  years  earlier.2 Of  these expenditures, 
which exclude salaries and other administrative 
expenses, almost $12.5 billion will  be spent on 
benefits under the "regular" state programs. 
All 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of 
Columbia are members of  the UI system, and 
in  each  of  these  "states,"  an  unemployed 
worker seeking UI benefits files a claim under 
that  state's  regular  benefit  program. 
Nevertheless,  a  tremendous  diversity  exists 
among the states in all aspects of the program. 
It is safe to say that no two states have quite the 
same  eligibility  requirements,  coverage, 
methods for determining either weekly benefit 
size  or  duration,  or  the  same  penalties  for 
various disqualifying acts. 
In  part, the problem exists because there are 
no  Federal  standards  for  determining  benefit 
eligibility,  size,  or  duration,  and  only  limited 
guidelines  and  requirements  for  job  coverage 
and  program  finan~ing.~  The following section 
discusses some of the reasons for the variety of 
methods used among the states for determining 
benefit rights and brietly examines some of  the 
methods in  use today. 
Benefit Eligibility 
The  framework  for  the  unemployment 
insurance  system  was  established  in  1935  by 
Janics  Manning,  Ch~ef,  Division  of  Actuarial  Service, 
Uncmployn~ent Insurance  Service,  U.S.  Department  of 
Labor, telephone interview.  January 27.  1976.  The author 
is especially indebted to Daryll Bauman of the Kansas City, 
Mo.  Regional  Oftice  of  the  UIS  for  his  assistance  in 
clarifling  many  of  the  concepts  and  operations  of  the 
systenl. 
See  lrr/brr?ru/iorr on  Unemployment  and  Uriemployment 
Contperrsu~ion  Progrutns. Subcommittee on Unenlployment 
Con~pens:~tion.  House  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means, 
September 22.  1975, pp. 3-6. for a discussion of  financing 
and coverage requirements. 
Titles  I11 and  IX of  the Social  Security  Act.4 
During the next few years, when the states were 
enacting their  UI  legislation,  it  was  generally 
agreed  that  eligibility  for  insurance  benefits 
should  depend  on  the  number  of  weeks  the 
unemployed  claimant  had  worked  in  covered 
employment  during some  specified  prior 
period,  known  as his  base  period.'  According 
to the developers of the program: 
A requirement of  this kind is  necessary  to pre- 
vent the [UI trust] fund from becoming depleted 
at the expense of  regularly  employed  workers  by 
the payment of benefits to persons who work only 
intermittently, spasmodically, or for brief seasonal 
periods in  compensable employment. 6 
The  program  was  thus  aimed  at  aiding  the 
regularly  employed  worker,  and  the eligibility 
requirements  were  designed  more  to  exclude 
workers of questionable labor force attachment 
than to identify deserving workers. 
Originally,  the states  intended  that  when  a 
claimant filed for unemployment  compen- 
sation,  his  former  employers  would  be 
contacted to provide information  on the actual 
number  of  weeks  he  worked  during  his  base 
period.  This weeks-of-work  eligibility  require- 
ment  was  predicated  on  the  belief  that  the 
longer  his  period  of  prior  employment,  the 
stronger  was  the  worker's  labor  force 
attachment. However, the difficulties  involved 
in  contacting  former  employers  for  data 
whenever  a  claim  was  filed  soon  became 
apparent.  Not  only  were  data processing 
The historical  perspective  on  eligibility  requirements  is 
drawn,  in  pan, from  George  S.  Roche,  Entitlemerlt  to 
Unemployment  Insurance  Benefits  (Kalamazoo:  W. E. 
Upjohn Institute, September  1973). ch. 3, pp. 29-46. 
5 Covered  employment consists  of  those jobs  specified  in 
the UI legislation as subject to the UI taxes which finance 
the  program.  In  most  states,  the claimant's  base  period 
consists of the first four of the last five completed calendar 
quarters preceding the present bout of  unemployment.  For 
a  precise  definition  of  the  important  terms  used  in 
discussing  the  UI  system,  see  Zell.  "Unemployment 
Insurance, Pan I." 
Social  Security  Board.  Social  Securit?,  in  Anterica 
(Washington: Government Printing Office.  1937). p. 123. 
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capabilities extremely limited  at the time, but 
workers often forgot the names of their former 
employers,  and  frequently,  employers  were 
either  out  of  business,  lacked  the  necessary 
work records, or were unwilling to cooperate. 
From  an  administrative  standpoint,  a 
superior  method for computing eligibility  was 
found in the use of employee wage records from 
employers'  quarterly  tax  returns.  The  states 
had  been  collecting  these  returns  for  many 
years,  and  by  using  them,  a  proxy  for  the 
number  of  weeks  worked  could  easily  be 
calculated.  One  proxy  requirement  that  was 
constructed specified  that to be eligible  for  a 
given weekly benefit  amount  (WBA), workers 
must have earned a fixed multiple of this WBA 
entitlement  during that quarter of  their  base 
period  in  which  they  had  their  highest  total 
dollar  earnings.  Since  all  but  4  of  the  51 
jurisdictions  in  the  UI  system  in  1937 
established their WBA so as to compensate 50 
per cent of  lost  wages  (up to a  relatively  high 
maximum),  an  eligibility  requirement  that  a 
claimant  must  have  earned,  for  example,  20 
times his  WBA  in  his  high  quarter, indirectly 
required  that  he  had  worked  10  weeks  at 
fu!l-time  wages.' 
By  1939, the first year that all the states were 
paying  benefits,  three  eligibility  requirements 
were  in  use.  While only 3 states continued  to 
use  a  weeks-of-work  requirement,  32  had 
adopted  the proxy of some  multiple  of  WBA, 
and 16 had chosen a flat dollar requirement for 
base period  earnings.  Yet, even  among the 32 
states  with  a  multiple-of-WBA  requirement, 
differing  attitudes  as  to  who  should  be 
compensated  led  to  the  legislation  of 
On  the assumption  that  the  wages  earned  in  this  high 
quarter were earned at the claimant's  normal weekly level, 
the  average  weekly  wage  lost  due  to  unemployment  was 
obtained  by  dividing these  high  quarter wages  (HQW) by 
13  weeks.  The weekly  benefit  amount  that  the  claimant 
would receive if eligible for benefits was then determined by 
the percentage of lost weekly wages that the state wished to 
replace. 
substantial variability in the actual  number of 
weeks of work required to establish eligibility. 
Furthermore, the two proxies for weeks-of-work 
were  biased  against  low-income  workers.  The 
requirement that earnings equal some multiple 
of  WBA  allowed  those  workers  who  were 
eligible  for  the  maximum  benefit  level  to 
qualify for benefits with  fewer  weeks  of  work 
than  were  required  of  lower  income  workers. 
The flat earnings requirement,  though  simple 
to administer, also had this property. 
During  the  static  1930's,  these  original 
eligibility  proxies  were,  though  imperfect,  at 
least stable  approximations  of  the  number  of 
weeks  actually  worked.  They  became far  less 
useful,  however, as the economy expanded  in 
the 1940's  and beyond.  As  wages grew  rapidly 
while employer  group pressure kept  minimum 
and maximum benefit levels from rising as fast, 
more  and  more  workers  could  qualify  for 
benefits, often  with fewer or more intermittent 
weeks of work than was originally intended. 
Because many previously ineligible groups of 
workers  became  eligible  to  receive  benefits, 
states  attempted  to  patch  up  their  eligibility 
proxies with more stringent add-on provisions, 
with  stricter  disqualification  regulations  often 
aimed  at  specific  groups,  or  finally,  with 
different proxies. The hodgepodge of  rules and 
regulations that exists today is the direct  result 
of  differing attitudes toward  eligibility and  the 
varied, but generally  unsuccessful,  approaches 
taken to try to restore the original relationships 
between the number of  weeks  actually  worked 
and its proxy measures. 
Currently  four such  eligibility  measures  are 
used,  each  pertaining  to  activity  during  the 
claimant's  base  period:  a specified  number of 
weeks  of  prior  employment,  by  25  states;  a 
multiple  of  high  quarter  earnings  (generally 
about 1.5  x HQW) by  13 states; a  multiple  of 
the weekly benefit amount, by  3 states; and  a 
flat  earnings  requirement,  by  4  states. 
Furthermore,  most  of  the  states  use  one  or 
more requirements in  addition to the principal 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City Unemployment Insurance 
one.8 For example, Missouri stipulates that an 
eligible claimant must have earned 30 times his 
WBA, $300 in one quarter, and some wages in 
at  least two  quarters.  These  overlapping 
requirements  are  part  of  the  patch-up 
procedure  mentioned  earlier,  and  were 
introduced  as  the  weaknesses  of  each  of  the 
individual methods were recognized. 
Benefit Size 
A longtime  objective  of  the UI  system  has 
been  to  try  to  compensate  eligible  insured 
workers at a level equal to about 50  per cent of 
their lost full-time weekly wages. However, even 
at the  beginning  of  the system,  a  maximum 
benefit amount was deemed  necessary in order 
to avoid  paying "excessively" large  benefits to 
high  wage  workers.  In  1965,  the  U.S. 
Department  of  Labor  estimated  that  if  this 
maximum benefit amount was set at two-thirds 
of the statewide average weekly wage in covered 
employment  (AWCE),  approximately  80  per 
cent  of  the insured  workers  would  receive  at 
least one-half of their lost weekly wage should 
they become unemployed. 
In  July  1969,  the  Nixon  Administration 
ofticially  asked  the  states  to  increase  their 
ceilings to at least this level of coverage. At that 
time only one state, Hawaii, had  its maximum 
weekly benefit equal to 65 per cent or more of 
its  AWCE,  while  21  states  paid  maximum 
benefits  of  at  least  50  per  cent  of  that  wage 
level.' Changes in  the direction of greater wage 
replacement,  however,  have  been  relatively 
slow.  As  of  July  1975,  only  14  states  had 
enacted  benefit  maximums of  at least  65 per 
cent of  average covered wages while maximum 
- 
8 See  "Significant  Provisions  of  State  Unemployment 
Insurance  Laws.  January  5,  1976."  Employment  and 
Training  Administration,  U.S.  Department  of  Labor; 
Roche.  pp.  33-44;  and  Strengthening  Unemployment 
I~rsuru~rca  (Kalamazoo:  W. E.  Upjohn  Institute.  May 
1975). pp. 22-24. 
9 In  1939,  when  all  of  the  then  51  states  began  paying 
benetits. 23 paid nlaxinium benefits of at least 65 per cent, 
and 46 of' at  least 50 per cent of AWCE. 
benefits in 45 states equaled or exceeded 50  per 
cent of AWCE.1° 
In  addition to their differences in  legislated 
maximum  weekly  benefit  levels,  the 52  states 
also use three distinct methods and a variety of 
formulas  in  calculating  from  past  wages  the 
actual weekly benefit amount  (WBA) to which 
claimants are entitled.  The  great  majority  of 
the states (39) calculate WBA  as a fraction of 
high quarter wages (HQW). On the assumption 
of  13 weeks  of  work  in  the  high  quarter,  a 
fraction of 1/26 yietds benefits equal to half the 
average  full-time  weekly  wage  earned. 
However, recognizing  that many workers  have 
some unemployment even in their high earnings 
quarter,  most  states  use  a  fraction  somewhat 
greater  than 1/26.  The  result  of  this  is  that 
workers who actually worked 13  weeks can be 
compensated at more than 50  per cent of  their 
lost wages (up to the maximum  benefit  level). 
In addition,  since high  quarter earnings often 
include bonuses, overtime pay, and back wages 
from  a  previous  quarter,  the  implied  high 
quarter  weekly  wage  often  tends  to overstate 
previous  wage  levels.  Fractions  used  by  the 
states now  range from  1/20 to 1/26,  with  six 
states employing  a  variable  formula  paying  a 
larger fraction to lower income workers. 
The  two  other  methods  that  are  used  to 
determine  a  claimant's  WBA  calculate  it  as 
either  a  per  cent  of  his  average  base  period 
weekly wage (nine states), or a per cent  of  his 
total  base  period  earnings  (four states).  This 
latter  method  is  the  easiest  of  the  three  to 
administer and also provides a means to restrict 
the benefit payments of seasonal  workers with 
low annual earnings but sufficient high quarter 
credits  to  qualify  for  benefits.  Its  major 
disadvantage is  that it "produces  WBA's  that 
bear  no  consistent  relationship  to the  actual 
weekly wages earned by  many claimants" who  - 
10 The question  of  what  level  of wage replacement  is  the 
socially  optimal one, given work  disincentive effects, is by 
no means settled, and will be addressed further in the final 
article  in  this series. 
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are not seasonal workers.ll Because of this, two 
claimants from the  same  state  with  identical 
wage  levels  but  different  amounts  of 
employment during their base periods may be 
entitled to very different WBA's. 
Benefit Duration 
Like the procedures for  determining weekly 
benefit  size,  the  methods  for  establishing  the 
duration  of  benefits  to  which  a  claimant  is 
entitled also vary greatly among the states. The 
principal  distinction  is  that between  the  nine 
states providing a uniform duration of benefits 
to  all  eligible  claimants  and  those  using  a 
variable  duration  formula.  Of  the  uniform 
duration states, Puerto Rico provides 20 weeks 
of  benefits,  Pennsylvania  30  weeks,  and  the 
remaining seven  states, 26  weeks.  Among  the 
variabIe duration states. the great majority  (34) 
provide for a maximum duration of 26 weeks of 
benefits,  with  the  remaining  nine  states 
specifying maximums of from 28 to 39 weeks. 
This  strong  consistency,  however,  is  more 
apparent  than  real.  In  all  but  eight  of  the 
variable duration states, the period of  benefits 
to which a claimant is entitled is determined by 
two factors: the state's WBA formula and some 
specified fraction, usually  % to %, of  his base 
period  earnings  in  covered  ernpl~yment.'~  By 
this  method, the claimant's  maximum  benefit 
duration  is  obtained  by  dividing  his  WBA 
entitlement  into  the  given  fraction  of  total 
wages. Thus, for example, if  a claimant earned 
$3,000  in  his  base  period,  and  the  allowed 
fraction  was  ?A,  the  maximum  amount  of 
benefits  that he could  draw would  be  $1,000. 
Assuming  an  average  weekly  salary  of  $100, 
and  a  WBA  of  $50,  his  maximum  benefit 
duration  would  be  20  weeks.  He  would  have 
had to have worked 39 weeks in his base period 
Strengfhening  Unemployment Insurance, pp. 34-35. 
(rather than the 30 weeks assumed  here), and 
earned  $3,900  in  order  to  be  eligible  for  a 
maximum  of  26  weeks  of  benefits.  Thus, 
because  the  WBA  formulas  and  specified 
fractions  vary  greatly  among  the states,  very 
large differences exist in the potential duration 
of benefits for given work experience. 
EXTENDED, EMERGENCY, AND 
SPECIAL BENEFIT PROGRAMS 
One result of the variable duration method of 
benefit  calculation  is  that  in  most  states  a 
significant proportion of claimants are entitled 
to  fewer  than  26  weeks  of  benefits. 
Furthermore,  depending  on  economic  con- 
ditions, between one-fifth  and one-third of  all 
beneficiaries exhaust their regular benefit 
entitlement each year.I3 As  is seen in Table 1, 
this  problem  is  especially  pronounced  in 
periods of economic downturns.  Iq response  to 
recessionary  increases  in  benefit  exhaustions, 
Congress enacted  in  1958,  and again  in  1961, 
Table 1 
EXHAUSTION OF 098 BENEFITS IN THE 
U  NiTED STATES:  SELECTED YEARS 
Total 
Exhaustees  Per  Cent  of All 
Year  (millions)  Beneficiaries  - 
1957 (prerecession)  1.1  22.7 
1958 (recession)  2.5  31 .O 
1960 (prerecession)  1.6  26.1 
1961 (recession)  2.4  30.4 
1969 (prerecession )  0.8  19.8 
1970 (recession)  1.3  24.4 
197 1 (recession)  2.0  29.9 
SOURCE:  Handbook  of  Unemployment  Insurance 
Financial  Data,  U.S.  Department  of  Labor, 
Marlpower Administration. 
In  the remaining eight states, all of which  use  weeks of  13 Strengthening  Unemployment  Insurance.  Table  3,  p. 
prior  employment  to  determine  benefit  eligibility,  the  38,  and  Saul  J.  Blaustein,  Unemployment  Insurance 
duration  of  benefits  is  determined  ax  a  fraction  of  the  Objectives and Issues (Kalamazoo: W.  E. Upjohn Inst~tute, 
number of weeks worked during the base period.  November 1968). 
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temporary  programs  designed  to  extend  the 
maximum duration of  benefits  from  26  to 39 
weeks.  Then,  in  August  1970,  a  permanent 
extended benefits (EB) program was enacted as 
Public Law 91-373, the Federal-State Extended 
unemployment' Compensation Act. 
Under  this  permanent  program,  which  is 
financed  equally  from  state  and  Federal 
unemployment  tax revenues, workers  who 
exhaust their regular UI benefits in  periods of 
abnormally  high  unemployment  are eligible  to 
receive their regular weekly benefit amounts for 
an  additional  period  of  up  to  one-half  their 
previous duration entitlement.  A  state is 
reimbursed  for  one-half  of  any  extended 
benefits  it pays, subject  to the restriction  that 
the  total  duration  of  regular  and  extended 
benefits  not  exceed  39  weeks.  Furthermore, 
states with maximum regular  benefit  durations 
in  excess of  26  weeks  may  be  reimbursed  for 
one-half of these additional benefits if  they are 
paid during a period in  which the EB program 
is  in  effect. 
The program may be triggered into effect on 
either the individual state or the national .level. 
Nationally, it is  triggered "on" by  a seasonally 
adjusted  insured unemployment rate of 4.5 per 
cent for 3 consecutive  months and is  triggered 
"oft" when  that rate drops below 4.5 per cent 
for  3  consecutive  months.14  A  state's  EB 
program  goes into effect when  its own  insured 
unenlployn~ent  rate  (not  seasonally  adjusted) 
averages  at  least  4  per  cent  for  any  13 
consecutive weeks and exceeds 120 per cent of 
its average rate for the same 13-week period  in 
each  of  the  2  preceding  years.  The  state 
program  triggers "off' after a 13-week  period 
in  which either restriction is not satisfied. Once 
this occurs, it  may not trigger "on" again for at 
least  14 weeks. Similarly, because the national 
"on" and "off" triggers  require specific 
unemployment  rates for each  of  3 consecutive 
p- 
l4 From January  1, 1975 to March  31. 1977.  states  have 
the  option  of  choosing  a  4.0  per  cent  national  insured 
uneniployment  rate trigger. 
months,  once  national  benefits  are  triggered 
"on" or "off' they must remain in that status 
for at least 14 weeks.  l5 
Federal Supplemental Benefits 
As  unemployment began to climb rapidly in 
mid-  1974, large numbers of  workers exhausted 
not  only  their  regular  benefits  but their 
extended  benefits as well.  In  response  to this 
rise  in  unemployment,  Congress  enacted  two 
new  UI  laws,  one  to  increase  the  maximum 
duration  of  benefits  and  one  to  expand  UI 
coverage  to  previously  excluded  groups  of 
workers. 
The  first  of  these  laws,  the  Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1974, was 
modeled  after a similar emergency  program in 
197  1.  Under  specified  emergency  benefit 
conditions,  the  new  law  provided  for  the 
payment  of  Federal  Supplemental  Benefits 
(FSB) to  persons  who  have  exhausted  their 
benefit rights under both the regular State and 
the  Federal-State  Extended  Benefit  programs. 
An  eligible  individual  was  entitled  to  receive 
emergency  benefits. equal to his  regular  WBA 
for  a  period  of  up  to  one-half  his  regular 
benefit  duration, but not  exceeding 13 weeks. 
The  emergency  unemployment  compensation 
program  went  into effect  in  a  state  whenever 
Federal-state  extended  benefits  were  also 
15 Merrill  G. Murray,  The  Duration  of  Unemployment 
Benefits  (Kalamazoo:  W.  E.  Upjohn  Institute,  January 
1974), pp. 32-33. 
Because  high  unemployment  often  continues  for  more 
than  a  year  during  a  recession,  the  120  per  cent  state 
trigger  requirement  became  more  and  more  difficult  to 
fulfill  as  the  early  recession  high  unemployment  was 
incorporated  into  the  unemployment,  rates  of  the  2 
comparison years. Due to this unforeseen  problem, several 
states with  very  high,  but steady,  insured  unemployment 
rates triggered out of their state programs in late 1971, and 
again  in  mid-1972.  In  response to this  problem.  Congress 
acted  six  times  to waive  this  trigger  requirement  at  the 
option of the state legislatures. Current permission  to waive 
the 120 per cent requirement  will expire  March  31.  1977. 
However,  fewer  than  half  the  states  have  voted  to 
implenient  this  change.  See  Murray.  pp.  39-47  and 
Ir~forn~ution  or1  Unrmploymenr. . . . pp. 10-12. 
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payable  in  that  state.  However,  unlike  the 
regular and EB programs, emergency payments 
are  financed  entirely  by  the  Federal 
Government through repayable advances from 
Federal general tax revenues to the program's 
account  in  the Federal  Unemployment  Trust 
Fund. 
Since the program's  inception  in  December 
1974, two major changes have been introduced 
by Congress.  First, the Tax Reduction  Act  of 
1975 increased the maximum duration of  FSB 
emergency benefits are to be paid according to 
a three-tier method.  When the IUR in  a state 
exceeds  6  per  cent,  26  weeks  of  emergency 
benefits  are  payable.  Should  the  rate fall  to 
between 5 and 6 per cent, only 13 weeks would 
be  payable.  Lastly,  if  the IUR  drops below  5 
per cent, no more emergency benefits could  be 
paid.I6 Thus, as the states shift from one tier to 
another,  they  begin  to  trigger  out  of  the 
program, with the last date for filing any claim 
being the week of March 20, 1977. 
payments  from  13  to 26  weeks,  making  the 
maximum  total  duration  of  all  benefits  an  The Special Unemployment 
unprecedented  65 weeks.  Later,  the  program  Assistance Program 
was  changed  to  its  present  form  by  the  The  second  law  passed  in  response  to  the 
Emergency  Compensation  and  Special  Assis-  rapidly  rising  unemployment  after  mid-1974 
tance Extension  Act  of  1975.  Under  this last 
act, the FSB program will terminate on March  16 The  one  exception  to  these shifts is that workers already 
31,  1977,  January  1, 1976 through that  receiving emergency  benefits would  continue to  be eligiblk 
for the maximum duration that was in effect before the 
the insured  rate  (IUR) in  shift took place.  See  Information  on  Unemployment. . . . 
the  individual  states  determines  how  pp. 13-14. 
Chart 1 
PMASE-081V SCWEDUBE FOR  TEMPORARY ill! PROGRAMS 
Gradual Reduction of  Temporary Programs on a State by State Basis 
as Unemployment Situation Improves in Each State 
(Beginning January 1, 1976) 
26  36  52  65 
Maximum Durat~on  When  The 
Weeks  Insured Unemployment Rate Is: 
Programs  for Covered  Workers 
.  .. .  .  6% or more in the state,  for the most 
recent 13  weeks 
5%  or  more on  the state,  for the most 
recent  13 weeks 
More  than  4.5%  (4.0%  opt~onal)  in 
the  natlon or 4.0%  In  the state. 
Less  than  th~s  level  In the natlon or 
the state 
w!  fi%  .  ..  State-flnanced Regular  Unemployment Insurance (26-week manmum) 
Federal-State  (50-50  shared  flnanclng)  Extended  Benef~ts  (13-week mox~mum) 
I]  Federal  Supplemental  Benef~ts  ( 100% Federol f~nanc!ng)(  13- week  maximum) 
Amended  Federal  Supplemental  Benefits (100% Federal flnanclng  I ( 13-  week max~mum) 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of  Labor, Manpower Administration, July 15, 1975. 
-- -  .  -  ...-  -.  -*  .  .  .  -- -  - -- 
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Chart 2 
DMRATUON OF BENEFITS UNDER 
PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT PROGRAMS 
~aximurn  Duration of Regular  Benefits  Federal-State EB  FSB- Jan. 1975 -  Mar. 1977  . * 
Weeks  26  39  65 
Special  Unemployment  Assistance 
I 
100%  Federal  General  Revenue  I 
Weeks  39 
Maximum  Duration  of  Regular  Benefits  (State  Act of 1975, and the Emergency Compensation and 
unemployment  insurance  laws):  In 41  states,  the  Special  Unemployment  Assistance  Act  of  1974): 
maximum regular duration is 26  weeks, but only 7  Temporary  2-year  program,  triggered  by  same 
of  these states  provide all eligible claimants  with  insured unemployment rates as  Federal-State EB. 
26  weeks; in the other 34  states, potential duration  Individual  duration  equal  to regular  duration,  not 
for a significant proportion of  beneficiaries is less  exceeding 26  weeks.  Not available after March 31, 
than 15 weeks. Puerto Rico has uniform duration of  1977. Subject to triggering off beginning January 1, 
20  weeks.  Ten  states,  one  of  which  provides  all  1976,  by  reason  of  lower  insured  unempl0,yment 
eligible  claimants  with  30  weeks,  have  regular  rate in the state. 
maximum durations exceeding 26  weeks. 
Special Unemployment  Assistance (SUA) (Title II, 
Federal-State  Extended  Benefits  (EB)  (Federal-  Emergency  Jobs  and  Unemployment  Assistance 
State Extended Unemployment Compensation  Act  Act  of  1974  as  amended  and  extended  by  the 
of  1970):  Permanent  program,  triggered  into  Emergency  Compensation and Special Unemploy- 
operation  by  high  state  or  national  insured  ment  Assistance  Act  of  1975):  Temporary  Byear 
unemployment  rates.  Maximum  duration  is  13  program of Federal benefits for workers not eligible 
weeks,  or  39  total  of  regular  and  EB;  individual  for regular state benefits. Benefit amount based on 
gets half his regular duration. In the 9 states with a  applying  state  benefit  formula  to  individual's 
regular maximum longer than 26  weeks,  the weeks  employment, disregarding difference between 
in excess  of  26  paid  during an  extended  benefit  covered and noncovered  work. Maximum  duration 
period are financed on a 50-50 basis.  39  weeks.  Program ends December 31, 1976,  with 
last benefits payable March 31, 1977. 
Federal Supplemental Benefits  (FSB) (Emergency  SOURCE:  U.S.  Department  of  Labor,  Manpower 
Unemployment  Compensation  Act  of  1974,  as  Administration, Unemployment lnsurance Service, 
amended and extended by sec. 701, Tax Reduction  July 15, 1975. 
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was  the-Emergency  Jobs  and  Unemployment 
Assistance  Act.  Under  Title  I1 of  this  act,  a 
temporary program of  Special  Unemployment 
Assistance (SUA) was developed to provide up 
to 26 weeks of benefits to unemployed workers 
who  were  not  covered  by  regular  Federal  or 
state UI programs. Funded entirely by Federal 
general tax revenues, SUA became operative in 
a local area when for 3 consecutive months the 
seasonally  adjusted  national  unemployment 
rate  averaged  at  least  6.0  per  cent,  or  the 
unadjusted local  area unemployment  rate 
averaged at least 6.5  per cent.I7 The program 
was  designed  to  trigger  "off'  when  neither 
condition was met. 
The SUA program expanded coverage to the 
approximately  12  million  wage  and  salary 
workers  employed  in  state  and  local 
government, farming, and domestic work. The 
l7  A  local  area  is  defined  as  a  political  entity  of  over 
100,000  population.  The  unemployment  rates  used  as 
triggers for SUA are conventional  unemployment  rates as 
opposed to the insured unemployment rate concept used in 
all the other programs. 
only significant group remaining uncovered was 
the self-employed. Benefits were made available 
to  all  former  employees  meeting  the  regular 
state program's employment and earnings 
requirements  during the most  recent  52-week 
period  (rather  than  during  the  state's  usual 
lagged base period). Any type of wage or salary 
employment was treated as covered and benefit 
entitlement was the same as under the regular 
state  program,  except  that  benefit  duration 
originally could not exceed 26 weeks. 
Initially scheduled to expire on December 31, 
1975,  the  SUA  program,  like  that  for 
emergency  benefits,  was  extended  by  the 
Emergency Compensation  and  Special  Unem- 
ployment  Assistance  Extension  Act  of  1975 
which  also 'increased  the  maximum  SUA 
benefit  duration  to  39  weeks.  The  Special 
Assistance  program  will  now  terminate  on 
December  31,  1976,  with  the  last  benefits 
payable  on  March  31,  1977.  Charts  1  and  2 
summarize the important characteristics of the 
various  UI  programs  in  effect  today  and  their 
scheduled  phaseout as the  unemployment 
situation improves throughout the nation. 
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